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Abstract 
 
In theory, profit and loss or risk sharing financing (RSF) is considered as a corner stone of Islamic 
finance. In practice, however, this feature of Islamic financial products has been argued by many to be 
negligible.  Instead, debt-based instruments, with conventional like features, have overwhelmed the 
Islamic financial industry. This study applied system GMM in modeling the determinants of RSF, and 
found that RSF is interest-free. We also found that, surprisingly, RSF is negatively related to the GDP 
growth. However, this is in accordance with those who argue that entrepreneurs in expectations of good 
economic conditions would take a fixed-cost financing, and thus reap the benefits of high return, rather 
than share the profit with banks. Similarly, in expectations of unfavorable economic conditions they 
would want to share their risk and loss with their financiers. Our results also imply a significantly very 
strong relationship between risk sharing deposits and RSF. However, the pass-through of these deposits to 
RSF is economically low and is about 0.40. In other words, only about 35-40% of the risk sharing 
deposits goes to the risk sharing financing. Thus, for practical implications, our findings suggest that 
through risk sharing products, Islamic banks can gain their ‘independence’ from the conventional banks 
and interest rates, the potential for which is enormous. Also, RSF seems to have countercyclical features 
that could enable policy makers to fight the unfavorable economic conditions through this banking 
channel.  
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Risk Sharing Financing of Islamic Banks:  Interest Free or Interest Based? 
 
Introduction 
The Islamic banking industry has been growing at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 38.5% 
between 2004 and 2011 (IFSB, 2013) and 17% from 2009 to 2013 (Earnst & Young, 2014-2015). The 
Islamic banking sector has been the driving force of the global Islamic finance industry. In 2013, Islamic 
finance assets were estimated at US$1.8 trillion and in 2014 are expected to surpass the US$2 trillion 
mark, while Islamic banking assets are expected to hit US$1.6 trillion (KFH Research Outlook 2014). 
However, Chong and Liu (2009) argue that this rapid growth of Islamic banking is largely driven by the 
resurgence worldwide rather than by the advantages of the PLS paradigm itself which is seen as the ideal 
mode of Islamic banking. 
Estimates underline that there are currently over 300 institutions in 80 countries carrying out ‘interest-
free’3 banking (Ergec and Aslan, 2012).Two countries, namely Sudan and Iran, operate fully under the 
Islamic system, while the other countries operate under the dual banking system. Within the dual banking 
system, there are countries which allow Islamic windows for the conventional banks such as Indonesia, 
Bahrain, Yemen etc. and those which do not allow the windows, such as Turkey, Kuwait etc. (Ergec and 
Aslan, 2012).The Islamic banking industry holds less than 2% of the banking assets worldwide (NBR)4. 
In most of the countries where Islamic banks operate parallel to conventional banks, the market share of 
Islamic banks is still very low. Except in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where Islamic banks hold about 60% 
and 35% respectively, in all other countries Islamic banks hold less than 25% market share (IFSB, 2013).  
In theory, a unique feature of Islamic finance in general and Islamic banking in particular is its profit-and-
loss sharing (PLS) or risk-sharing paradigm5. Most theoretical models of Islamic banking are based 
mainly on two partnership contracts, named Mudarabah or Musharakah. While Mirakhor (2009) sees risk 
sharing as the objective of Islamic finance, Askari (2012) argues that Islamic financial system should be 
structured on risk sharing and prohibition of debt financing. On the other hand, Abdul-Rahman et. al. 
(2014) argue that from the New Institutional Economic Theory context, PLS in the environment of 
Islamic banks as financial intermediaries is difficult to grow. They suggest that PLS contracts would best 
be positioned if Islamic banks play the role of genuine entrepreneurs instead of intermediaries as currently 
practiced.A risk sharing financial system would not have ‘anything’ to do with riba or interest. Because, 
as we know, in the PLS arrangements the return is determined ex-post. Only the sharing ratio between the 
partners is determined ex-ante.  
However, due to supervisory and competitive pressures in the market place the current practices of 
Islamic banks have significantly diverged from the theoretical models initially envisaged (Rosly, 1999; 
Mirakhor, 2010; Archer et al., 2010; Farook et al., 2012). Only a negligible portion of Islamic banks’ 
financing is strictly PLS based (Chong and Liu, 2009) and to-date it comprises less than 3% of the 
                                                          
3 Islamic banks claim to be interest-free. This is so by the fact that they do not apply interest in their financing 
businesses. However, various studies have shown that Islamic financial products in general and banking products 
in particular are exposed to the interest rate risk, as we will see later in our literature review section. 
4 The National Bureau of Asian Research. 
5 These two are used interchangeably. 
 average of total financing in Malaysia (Abdul-Rahman et al., 2014). Instead, debt-like financing 
instruments such as Murabahah (mark-up or cost plus financing), Ijarah (Islamic leasing), Istisna (contract 
manufacturing), etc. are used, which Abdul Kader and Leong (2009) see very similar to conventional 
bank loans. Similarly, Chong and Liu (2009) see Islamic banking in Malaysia not very different from 
conventional banking.  
Now, having a small market share accompanied with the debt-like instruments, which are interest rate 
benchmarked and are substantially not different from the conventional loans except in their contracts, 
Islamic banks are doomed to be price takers. Unless they can offer products that are in their nature 
completely different from their conventional counterparts, they would inevitably end up being exposed to 
the same or similar types of risks of the conventional banks, the major of which is interest rate risk. 
Islamic banks do have their unique products on both liability and asset sides. On the liability side, Islamic 
banks offer profit sharing investment accounts (PSIA) under the Mudarabah contract along other fixed 
income products. On the asset side, they have more varieties of products based on Mudarabah and 
Musharakah. Some of these products are financial instruments offered by the government, regulator and 
other institutions, but some are financing of the real sector activities. Real sector financings generally 
carry the potential for higher return, but they are also more risky than the financial instruments. Also, they 
are less liquid, because these are generally long term real projects and the investors might not be able to 
get out of them unless the project is completed. 
In the literature, we find that a lot of studies have been done on the determinants of Islamic banks’ assets 
or financings. Assets or financings are all put together and treated as one even though they may be 
completely different, at least in the case of Islamic banking. It is for this reason that we want to make a 
humble attempt to take PLS financings out and study them separately in order to find out its determinants. 
And also to see whether they are different from the determinants of Islamic financings/assets in total, 
which are dominated by debt-like instruments, as well as conventional loans.  
Having said the above, the main objective of this paper is to determine whether PLS financing of Islamic 
banks is interest-free or interest-based. Also, we want to see how other factors, bank-specific and country-
specific, may affect the PLS financing of Islamic banks. Lastly, we want to see how much of Profit 
Sharing Investment Deposits/Accounts goes into PLS financing. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section provides literature review. The third section will 
describe the data and methodology used in this study. In the fourth section, we shall analyze and discuss 
the empirical results. Finally, in the fifth section, the paper will conclude with suggested implications and 
recommendations for the industry practitioners and policy makers. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Due to short history of Islamic banking industry, it is noticeable that the literature on determinants of 
conventional lending is more available than on the Islamic bank financing. In general, it is found that 
determinants of conventional bank lending are divided into two main categories, i.e. microeconomic and 
macroeconomic factors. Microeconomic factors are those factors which are bank-specific as deposits, 
bank size, bank capitalization, collateral security, capital ratios, non-performing loans, type of ownership, 
liquidity, etc.. On the other hand, macroeconomic variables used include GDP, interest rate, inflation, 
stock prices, exchange rates, industrial indices, etc.  
In studying bank-specific determinants of conventional bank lending, Chernykh & Theodossiou (2011) in 
their study of banks in Russia found that bank size, capitalization and provision for losses have positive 
power over determining the long-term business loans, while type of ownership was found to be 
insignificant. By studying six countries of Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(CEMAC), Constant and Ngomsi(2012) found that bank size, long-term liabilities and capitalization 
positively affect the business loans, while non-performing loans have been found statistically 
insignificant. Hossain et. al. (2013) in their case study of RAKUB bank in Bangladesh found out that 
deposits positively affect the loans.  
In the case of Islamic banks and the bank-specific determinants, Kader and Leong (2009) tested 
conventional lending rate and base lending rate as determinants of BBA property financing in Malaysia 
and found that they are both significantly positive. Rama and Kassim (2013) studied Indonesian Islamic 
banks and found that Islamic finance rate, Islamic and conventional deposit rates and conventional 
lending rate do not have any significance in determining the Murabahah financing. Karim et. al. (2014) in 
studying size and liquidity as the determinants of Islamic financing and conventional lending found that 
the effects are the same on Islamic and conventional, i.e. negative and positive effects respectively.  
In studying macroeconomic variables as determinants of conventional bank lending, Kim and Moreno 
(1994) and Ibrahim (2006) tested stock price and both found it to be significantly positive in determining 
bank lending in Japan and Malaysia respectively.  
Ibrahim (2006) also tested for GDP and found it significantly positive. The same results were obtained by 
Pruteanu-Podpiera (2007) for Czeck Republic, by Du (2011) for China, by Constant and Ngomsi (2012) 
for CEMAC, and by Karim et. al. (2014) for both conventional and Islamic banks.  
Interest rate was found to have a significantly negative effect on conventional bank lending in Malaysia 
by Kader and Leong (2009) and in Turkey by Ergeca and Arslan (2011). However, these two papers 
found that the interest rate effect on Islamic bank financings is positive, while contrary to that, Adebola 
et. al. (2011) found the same effect as on the conventional bank loans in Malaysia. 
The effects of inflation on conventional bank lending and Islamic bank financing are very mixed across 
the literature. Karim et. al. (2014) found it to have negative effects on conventional banks, but positive on 
Islamic banks, while Du (2011) studying conventional banks found it to have positive effects if it is less 
than 3.9% and negative if it is more than 3.9%. On the other side, it was found insignificant in the case of 
conventional banks by Pruteanu-Podpiera (2007), Constant and Ngomsi (2012) and in the case of Islamic 
banks by Rama and Kassim (2013).  
Other variables such as exchange rate, industrial indices, producer price indices have been found mainly 
insignificant, see for example Ibrahim (2006), Adebola (2011), Rama and Kassim (2013). 
MODEL, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Model  
To investigate the determinants of risk sharing financing of Islamic banks, with the main focus on 
relationship between risk sharing financing and interest rate, we propose the following empirical model 
based on the relevant literature: 
 RSFi, t = β0 + β₁RSFi, t-1 + β₂RSDi, t + β₃BSi, t + β₄INTRi, t + β₅GDPGRi, t + β₆INFLi, t + εi, t 
Where: 
‘i’ indicates the bank (i = 1,. . .,132), 
‘t’ indicates the annual time period (t = 2008,. . .,2013) 
RSF – Risk sharing financing (Mudarabah, Musharakah and Musharakah Mutanaqisah financings of the 
real activities, not financial instruments) 
RSD – risk sharing deposits or profit sharing investment account (Mudarabah deposits) 
BS – Size of the bank defined as the natural logarithm of total assets 
GDPGR – GDP growth rate 
INTR – Real interest rate 
INFL – Inflation 
The effects of the selected variables on either conventional bank lending or Islamic bank financing are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Effects of selected variables on bank financing/lending 
Papers Deposits Size GDP/GDP	growth Interest	rate Inflation
Hossain	et.	al.	(2013)	for	CB +
Chernykh	&	Theodossiou	(2011)	for	CB +
Constant	and	Ngomsi	(2012)	for	CBs + x
Ibrahim	(2006)	for	CBs +
Pruteanu-Podpiera	(2007)	for	CBs + -
Du	(2011)	for	CBs
+
+	if<3.9%
-	if>3.9%
Constant	and	Ngomsi	(2012)	for	CBs +
Karim	et.al.	(2014)	for	CBs	&	IBs - + -/+
Kader	&	Leong	(2009)	for	CB	&	IBs -/+
Ergeca	and	Arslan	(2011)	for	CB	&	IBs -/+
Adebola	et.al.	(2011)	for	IBs -
Rama	and	Kassim	(2013)	for	IBs x
Our	expected	effect	on	RSF + +/- +/- x/+/- -  
Note:  
‘+’ indicates positive relationship  
‘-‘ indicates negative relationship 
‘x’ –indicates no significant relationship 
Data  
The data used in our study is annual data for 2008-2013. It covers 132 fully-fledged Islamic banks from 
28 different countries. The data for bank specific variables was obtained from Islamic Banking 
Intelligence,6while the data for macroeconomic variables was obtained from the World Bank.7Risk-
sharing financing and risk-sharing deposits data will be used in its absolute values form, while the size is 
computed by using the natural logarithm of total assets. The macroeconomic variables are all in 
percentage points. Table 2 provides the summary of descriptive statistics for the selected variables. Table 
3 provides the matrix of correlation coefficients that based on the results indicates a mixed correlation 
among the variables.  
Table 2: Summary of descriptive statistics 
Variable  Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RSF 428 1.03E+09 2.49E+09 1620 1.58E+10 
RSD 499 3.29E+09 5.65E+09 52254.77 3.61E+10 
BS 686 20.86308 2.296893 13.17178 24.99047 
INTR 641 2.140296 8.844543 -19.9269 47.05332 
GDPGR 790 3.262196 4.286876 -15.08839 17.66303 
INFL 791 10.22298 10.14223 -4.863278 39.26636 
 
Table 3: Correlations 
  RSF RSD BS INTR GDPGR INFL 
RSF 1           
RSD 0.827 1         
BS 0.5651 0.7089 1       
INTR -0.28 -0.2095 -0.1831 1     
GDPGR -0.2268 -0.1353 -0.0972 0.2075 1   
INFL 0.4778 0.3046 0.2468 -0.4648 -0.6452 1 
 
                                                          
6www.islamicbankingintelligence.com 
7www.data.worldbank.org 
 Methodology 
For our set of data, which is panel data with very low number of T’s and quite a high number of N’s, the 
most appropriate model to use is dynamic panel data. Dynamic panel data regressions are characterized 
by two sources of persistence over time, namely, autocorrelation due to the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors and individual effects characterizing the heterogeneity among 
the individuals. The endogeneity problem associated with dynamic models is dealt with in this paper 
using the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
which is more efficient than the instrumental variable (IV) estimation procedure suggested by Anderson 
and Hsiao (1981). Arellano and Bond (1991)demonstrate additional instruments can be obtained in a 
dynamic panel data model if one utilizes the orthogonality conditions that exist between lagged values of 
the dependent variable and the disturbances. Using these moment conditions, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
propose a two-step difference GMM estimator. Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate however that the 
instruments used in the difference GMM estimator become less informative in two important cases. 
Firstly, as the autoregressive parameter increases towards unity; and second as the variance of the 
parameter effect increases relative to the variance of the transitory shocks. Arellano and Bover (1995)and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) propose that an additional mild stationarity restriction on the initial conditions 
process allows for the use of an extended system GMM estimator. The system GMM estimation is found 
to be more appropriate in the presence of variables that are close to a random walk (Bond, 2002; 
Roodman, 2009). The difference GMM estimation under these conditions is found to suffer from a weak 
instrument problem (Sarafidis et al., 2009). The difference GMM approach also magnifies gaps in 
unbalanced panels (Roodman, 2009), which is unbalanced in our case. In view of the above, we run both 
the two-step difference and system GMM estimations for our panel data set (seethe tables in Appendix). 
We follow up with post estimation specification tests, namely the Sargan (1976) test for over-identifying 
restrictions and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for no autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors.  
Having pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of each model and having our tests not completely 
fulfilling either of the two model requirements, i.e. standard and system GMM, we base our decision on 
the following: 
Our data is unbalanced, and as such will have magnified gaps in our panels if the difference GMM is 
selected, 
As a rule of thumb, the system GMM is more appropriate if N is greater than T, which is the case in our 
data. On the other hand, the standard GMM is more appropriate if T is greater than N and the 
autoregressive parameter is low. In our case, T is not greater than N, but the autoregressive parameter is 
lower than the required 0.8  by Roodman (2009) (ours is about 0.3), 
The estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable for the two-step system estimator increases 
significantly on average relative to the two-step difference estimator (it increases from 0.04 to 0.29), 
which is a lot more than the required 50% by Windmeijer (2005) in order to correct the downward bias of 
standard errors,  
Based on the above, we choose the system GMM as more appropriate for our type of data and variables. 
However, we should bear in mind that high persistence in theseries is a necessary condition for 
expectations of asymptotic efficiency gains using the system GMM (Blundell and Bond,1998; Roodman, 
2009), which is not met in our case.  
We apply the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to the reported standard errors in the two-step 
estimation, without which estimations of the standard errors tend to be severely downward biased. 
Specifying Windmeijer corrected (WC-robust) standard errors also produces variance–covariance 
estimates that are robust to heteroskedasticity. With regards to the instrument proliferation problem, we 
do not follow the Roodman(2009) rule of thumb that suggests collapsing the instrument matrix. It is 
however relevant to note given the time series dimension in this study, the number of instruments does 
not outnumber the individual units (number of groups). This suggests potential problems of instrument 
proliferation are not obvious. Issues associated with instrument proliferation are particularly suspected in 
system GMM estimations as a large instrument collection over fits endogenous variables even as 
itweakens the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity (Roodman, 2009).  
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
We begin our analysis by determining the variables that are relevant in explaining the variation in RSF for 
our sample. The basic results from the two-step system GMM WC robust regression are reported in Table 
4, while the other reports are available in Appendix. 
 
Table 4: Two-step system GMM WC-Robust 
RSF Coef. 
WC-Robust 
Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       RSF L1. 0.2956922 0.0287696 10.28 0.000 0.2393049 0.3520796 
       RSD 0.397399 0.0230105 17.27 0.000 0.3522993 0.4424987 
BS 6.40E+08 2.05E+08 3.12 0.002 2.37E+08 1.04E+09 
GDPGR -7.92E+07 2.08E+07 -3.81 0.000 -1.20E+08 -3.84E+07 
INTR -4649784 6263446 -0.74 0.458 -1.69E+07 7626345 
INFL -5.48E+07 1.13E+07 -4.86 0.000 -7.69E+07 -3.27E+07 
_cons -1.29E+10 4.54E+09 -2.85 0.004 -2.18E+10 -4.04E+09 
No. of observations 192           
No. of groups 58 
     No. of instruments 20 
     
 AR(1) Prob > z 0.5298 
     AR(2) Prob > z 0.9572      
 
The very high significance of RSD in explaining the variation in RSF is expected. Islamic banks do not 
really have many choices when it comes to placement of RSD, and especially so if we take into account 
that a portion of RSD, i.e. restricted profit sharing investment deposits, goes into specifically determined 
activities or projects. Islamic capital and money markets in general are undeveloped, even more when it 
comes to capital and money market instruments based on profit and loss sharing basis. Thus, this is 
expected to be their main channel and as such is in accordance with our expectations. However, the pass-
through or the amount of each RSDunit that is channeled towards RSF is quitelow. This means that, on 
average, out of each dollar deposited into RSD, only about 0.4 or 40% goes into RSF. This ratio is 
considered very low if we take into account that profit and loss sharing type financings generally offer 
higher returns. The truth is, they also come with a higher risk. However, knowing the regulatory 
restrictions or burdens on RSF, it is not surprising that this pass-through of the RSD is very low. In 
calculation of the capital adequacy, the RSF is considered as very risky and as such the risk weight 
assigned can go up to 400%. If we add to this the fact that risk sharing financing by its nature requires 
entrepreneurial skills, which Islamic banks still do not have, rather than mere intermediation, we get a 
clearerpicture why this pass-through is very low. 
The result on bank size implies significant positive relationship with risk sharing financing. In other 
words, bigger banks practice more RSF than the small banks. This relationship can be explained 
intuitively that bigger banks can afford more risky assets in their portfolio and may also be better 
equipped for such endeavors. 
A very interesting result is that reported on interest rate. All the papers that we have reviewed found that 
there is a significant relationship, which is negative with the conventional bank lending and mixed when 
it comes to Islamic bank financing. Interestingly, our test shows that there is no relationship betweenRSF 
and interest rate even at the 10% significance level. Looking at this from a traditional banking point of 
view, it is quite surprising that any banking product would be free from the interest rate influence. 
However, knowing that the nature of risk sharing financing is fundamentally equity-like, whereby the 
returns are determined ex-post, this result is not surprising at all.  
Another interesting and unexpected result is the one on GDP. It implies very significant negative 
correlation of GDP growth with risk sharing financing. In other words, risk sharing financing increases 
when the GDP growth decreases, and vice versa. Normally, we would expect RSF to grow when the 
economy grows, and vice versa. All the previous studies that we have reviewed show positive relationship 
between GDP/GDP growth and bank financing or lending (Ibrahim 2006;Pruteanu-Podpiera 2007; Du 
2011; Constant and Ngomsi 2012; Karim et.al. 2014). However, we have to look at the nature of risk 
sharing financing and its stage of development. RSF assumes that the financier bears the entire risk of 
mundane loss in case of Mudarabah financing and proportional risk of loss in case of Musharakah 
financing. Knowing this, the above result may imply that entrepreneurs would not want to take risk 
sharing financing when they expect high returns from their projects for which they need financing, 
because they do not want to share the ‘high’ returns. Similarly, when they are not sure of their expected 
returns, they prefer to take risk sharing financing because they will not bear the loss (in case of 
Mudarabah), or they will bear it only partially (in case of Musharakah).  
Another significant variable obtained by the tests is inflation, which implies negative relationship with 
risk sharing financing. The results confirm the previous studies done by Pruteanu-Podpiera (2007) and 
Karim et.al. (2014) who also found that the relationship between conventional loans and inflation is 
negative. 
CONCLUSION 
In Islamic economic and finance theories, risk sharing financing is a unique feature of Islamic financing 
and is the objective of Islamic finance (Mirakhor, 2009). By its nature, this type of financing should have 
nothing to do with interest. Some studies have been done on determinants of Islamic banks’ financings in 
total and have found positive or negative relationship with the interest rate (Kader and Leong, 2009; 
Ergeca and Arslan, 2011; Adebola et.al., 2011). However, all the eggs were put in one basket and studied 
together as if all the eggs were the same. Islamic banking currently is predominantly involved in debt-like 
financing, whereby the profit rates are benchmarked to the interest rates. However, Islamic banks have 
risk sharing products that are not debt-like, but which so far, to the best of our knowledge, have not been 
studied.  
This study uses previously established theories and models to investigate the relationship of risk sharing 
financing with other bank-specific and country-specific variables. We found that risk sharing financing of 
Islamic banks is interest-free. If Islamic banking wants to gain its ‘independence’ from the conventional 
banking, then this is the right way or one of the possible ways.  
The study has also found that currently risk sharing financing faces the challenge of moral hazard and 
agency cost as is implied by the negative relationship between RSF and GDP growth. The agents or 
entrepreneurs take advantage of RSF when facing tough times, and ignore it when facing good times. 
Similarly, we found that the bank size matters in risk sharing financing and that inflation is not a friend of 
risk sharing financing.  
We also found that risk sharing financing used by Islamic banks has not been up to the expectations. Our 
study has found that there exists a strong relationship between RSF and RSD, but also unexpectedly low 
channeling of RSD to RSF. Some of the possible reasons are:(i) inadequate regulatory framework which 
constrains RSF through imposition of high risk weight in capital adequacy computation, (ii) intermediary 
nature of Islamic banks which is not conducive for RSF. Therefore, in order  
Overall, the findings of this study oppose earlier findings (Adebola et.al., 2011, Abdul Kader & Leong, 
2009, Chong and Liu 2009) that Islamic banks financing is complementary, and not a substitute to 
conventional banks’ lending. Risk sharing financing of Islamic banks has been proven to be unique and 
interest free. Hence, for the development of interest free Islamic banking and Islamic finance it is 
recommended that Islamic banks should accommodate more risk sharing products. Regulators may also 
see that high risk weight assigned for risk sharing financing is burdensome for Islamic banks and impedes 
their aspirations to become interest free. 
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